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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.
VICTOR VIALPANDO,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 20020405-CA
Priority No. 2.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)
(1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A.

Whether the trial court erred in determining that the officer possessed reasonable,
articulable suspicion to stop and seize Mr. Vialpando?

Standard of Review: This Court reviews a trial court's conclusions of law for
correctness, "with a measure of discretion given to the trial judge's application of the legal
standard to the facts." State v. Justesen. 2002 WL 992327 (Utah App. May 16, 2002);
State v. Veteto. 6 P.3d 1133 (Utah App. 2000). The factual findings underlying trial
court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed using a
clearly erroneous standard. State v. Galvan. 37 P.3d 1197, 1198 (Utah App. 2001)
(citations omitted). "A trial court's determination of reasonable suspicion is reviewed for
correctness." Id.

B.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that the Intoxilyzer
results were reliable and therefore admissible at trial?

Standard of review: A trial court's evidentiary rulings are reviewed by this Court
pursuant to an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Barela, 779 P.2d 1140, 1142 (Utah
App.1989).
C.

Whether the trial court erred in failing to properly instruct the jury regarding the
elements of actual physical control in a criminal case?

Standard of Review: "The standard of review for jury instructions to which
counsel has objected is correctness." State v. Pearson. 985 P.2d 919, 921 (Utah
App.1999); State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 544 (Utah App.1998). An inaccurate
instructions upon the basic elements of the offense is reversible error that can never be
considered harmless. Pearson, 985 P 2d at 922.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Constitutional provision
U.S. Constitution, amend. IV

Statutory Provisions
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Victor Vialpando was charged with one count of driving under the influence of
alcohol stemming from an incident on July 2, 2000, wherein Mr. Vialpando is alleged to
have been operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol. (R. 1-2.) At arraignment, the Honorable Judge Walter Ellett
appointed the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association (LDA) to represent Mr. Vialpando.
(R. 6.) At the pretrial conference, defense counsel set the matter for a motion to suppress
hearing. (R. 11.) Defense counsel filed a motion and memorandum in support of
suppressing all evidence discovered as the result of an illegal stop and seizure and to
exclude admission ofthelntoxilyzer results at trial. (R. 12-25.) On December 4, 2000,
the trial court denied the motion without hearing any testimony and without a responsive
motion by the state. (Mot. Hrg. 2000 1-3.)
Defense counsel filed a motion to reconsider. (R. 30-48.) The court agreed to hold
a hearing on the motion and the matter was set for March 12, 2001. (R. 59.) At the
hearing, the court heard testimony from the arresting officer and denied the defendant's
motions. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 26-27.) The matter was then set for jury trial. After numerous
requests by the state to continue the trial, a jury trial was held on April 24, 2002, wherein
Mr. Vialpando was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 2, 2000, at about 1.00 or 1:30 in the morning, Utah Highway Patrol
Trooper Plank was northbound on 3200 West approaching South Frontage Road when he
saw a man, later identified as Victor Vialpando, chasing a woman. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 3.)
When he saw the man and woman, they were about 50 yards away. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 4.)
Thereafter, the trooper observed the man and woman run toward him, southbound, on the
sidewalk. (Mot Hrg. Tr. 4.)
Believing that something was not right, that "something was going on," Trooper
Plank activated his siren and overhead lights and turned around to stop the man and
woman. (Mot Hrg. 4, 5.) The Trooper explained that he "wanted to make sure [the
woman] was going to be alright." (Mot. Hrg. 4.) When asked if he believed "that some
type of criminal offense was occurring or could have occurred," the trooper responded,
"Could, yes." (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 4.)
The trooper turned his vehicle around at North Frontage Road and saw Mr.
Vialpando cross the street and get into a vehicle. (Mot Hrg Tr. 4.) The Trooper pulled in
directly behind the vehicle occupied by Mr. Vialpando, and then approached Mr.
Vialpando to see why he had been chasing the woman. (Mot Hrg. Tr. 4.) Mr. Vialpando
responded that the woman was his girlfriend and they had been in an argument. (Mot.
Hrg. Tr. 5.) Notably, when the trooper approached the vehicle, it was quite clear that the
woman was not with Mr. Vialpando or anywhere nearby. (Mot Hrg. Tr. 12.) Moreover,
4

the trooper did not attempt to locate the woman. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 12-13.)
Upon making contact with Mr. Vialpando, the Trooper observed that Mr.
Vialpando was sitting in the driver's seat, his eyes were red, his speech was slurred, and
there was a strong odor of alcohol emanating from him. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 5, 13.) The
vehicle's engine was not running. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 13.) Based on these observations, the
trooper asked Mr. Vialpando to submit to a number of field sobriety tests, including the
horizontal gaze nystagmus, the nine-step walk and turn, and the one-leg stand. Due to
the trooper's belief that Mr. Vialpando had failed to pass each of these tests, the trooper
arrested Mr. Vialpando and asked him to submit to a breath test. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 8.) Mr.
Vialpando agreed to do so. (Mot Hrg. Tr. 8.) The Trooper requested that test at
approximately 1:37 a.m. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 9.)
En route from the scene of Mr. Vialpando's arrest to the testing site, Mr.
Vialpando vomited. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 9.) Thereafter, the trooper began conducting the
Baker1 fifteen minute period of observation. According to the trooper's testimony, the
Baker test requires at least a fifteen minute period of observation of the subject prior to
administering the breathalyzer test. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 10.) The purpose of the Baker test,
according to the trooper, is to make sure that there is nothing introduced into the subject's
mouth prior to submitting to the intoxilyzer that would result in the introduction of
1

State v. Baker. 355 P.2d 806 (Wash. 1960) (setting forth foundational
requirements that the state must prove before breath alcohol results can be admitted into
evidence at trial).
5

alcohol into the mouth. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 10.) The trooper testified that he began his
observation of Mr. Vialpando at 1:45 a.m., after Mr. Vialpando vomited. (Mot Hrg. 10.)
The test results returned at 2:00 a.m. showing Mr. Vialpando had a blood alcohol level of
.175%. (Mot.Hrg.Tr.il.)
The trooper testified that he conducted a portion of the Baker observation period
while he was driving. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 17-18.) During the remainder of the observation
period, the trooper was filling out paperwork. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 19.) Prior to having Mr.
Vialpando blow into the Intoxilyzer machine, the trooper did not ask Mr. Vialpando if he
had burped or vomited again during the fifteen minute period. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 19.)
Defense counsel filed a motion to suppress/dismiss in the above-numbered matter
in the fall of 2000. (R. 12-25.) Without holding a hearing or considering evidence, the
court denied the motion. (Mot Hrg. 2000 1-3.) Defense counsel subsequently filed a
motion to reconsider, which the trial court granted. (R. 59.)
A motion hearing was held on March 12, 2001, before the Honorable Judge Walter
"Bud' Ellett. The purpose of the hearing was to address whether the trooper possessed
reasonable, articulable suspicion to seize Mr. Vialpando and whether the Trooper
complied with the Baker test requirements in administering the intoxilyzer. Trooper
Plank testified at the hearing as to his reason for seizing Mr. Vialpando. The trooper also
testified that while transporting Mr. Vialpando to the Sorenson Multi-cultural Center, at
855 West California Avenue to administer the breath test, Mr. Vialpando vomited.
6

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied Mr. Vialpando's motion. The
court concluded that with respect to the stop, Officer Plank's observations were
"sufficient for me to believe that he thought that a crime had either been committed or
was about to commit, gives him a basis to turn around, stop and inquire. So I think that
test has been met. I think he had a right to do that." (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 26.) With respect to
the Baker test, the court concluded that the trooper "did observe this defendant for a
period of 15 minutes prior to the test being given. I don't think that belching or burping
is going to be an expiration that was anticipated by State v. Baker. I think that's a
situation where it brings something into the mouth. I don't think that the odor from the
stomach would constitute something that could not be, since it could not be determined, it
would have an effect on that Breathalyzer." (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 27.)
Subsequently, the matter proceeded to a jury trial. At trial, counsel objected to a
particular jury instruction offered by the state. Specifically, defense counsel objected to
the court providing an instruction to the jury stating: "A person need not actually move,
or attempt to move, a vehicle in order to have actual physical control, the person only
needs to have the apparent ability to start and move the vehicle." (Trial Tr. 81-82; R.
177.) Counsel objected to the instruction because it was lifted directly from civil cases
involving administrative hearings where the Department of Motor Vehicles was asked to
make a determination as to whether a person was in actual physical control of a vehicle
for the purpose of revocation or suspension of an individual's driving privilege. (Trial Tr.
7

81-82.) Counsel argued that the standards for the revocation of an individual's driving
privileges are certainly different from those required to prove an individual guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt of driving under the influence of alcohol, a criminal offense. (Trial
Tr. 81-82.) The court included the instruction, overruling counsel's objection. (Trial Tr.
81.) Subsequently, the jury found Mr. Vialpando guilty and the court sentenced him on
the same day. (Trial Tr. 82-85; R. 185-86.) This appeal follows.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Vialpando's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and
seizures was violated when the trooper detained him without reasonable suspicion or
probable cause to believe that he had committed or was about to commit a criminal
offense. Moreover, the trial court erred in admitting breath alcohol test results without
requiring the state to meet minimal foundation requirements. Finally, the trial court erred
when it improperly instructed the jury as to the level of proof required to prove an
individual guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of exercising actual physical control over a
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.

8

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT TROOPER
PLANK HAD REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP MR. VIALPANDO
Because Trooper Plank lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop Mr.

Vialpando, the trial court erred in determining that the trooper's stop and seizure of Mr.
Vialpando was proper under the Fourth Amendment. This Court reviews a trial court's
conclusions of law for correctness, "with a measure of discretion given to the trial judge's
application of the legal standard to the facts." State v. Justesen, 2002 WL 992327 (Utah
App. May 16, 2002); State v. Veteto. 6 P.3d 1133 (Utah App. 2000). The factual findings
underlying trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are
reviewed using a clearly erroneous standard. State v. Gal van, 37 P.3d 1197, 1198 (Utah
App. 2001) (citations omitted). "A trial court's determination of reasonable suspicion is
reviewed for correctness." Id
Here, Trooper Plank observed a man, later identified as Victor Vialpando, chasing
a woman. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 3.) When he saw the man and woman, they were about 50
yards away. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 4.) The trooper then observed the man and woman run
toward him, southbound, on the sidewalk. (Mot Hrg. Tr. 4.) Believing that something
was not right, that "something was going on," Trooper Plank activated his siren and
overhead lights and turned around to stop the man and woman. (Mot Hrg. 4, 5.) The
Trooper explained that he "wanted to make sure [the woman] was going to be alright."
(Mot. Hrg. 4.) When asked if he believed "that some type of criminal offense was
9

occurring or could have occurred," the trooper responded, "Could, yes." (Mot. Hrg. Tr.
4.) The trooper turned his vehicle around and at North Frontage Road and saw Mr.
Vialpando cross the street and get into a vehicle. (Mot Hrg Tr. 4.) The Trooper pulled in
directly behind the vehicle occupied by Mr. Vialpando, and then approached Mr.
Vialpando to see why he had been chasing the woman. (Mot Hrg. Tr. 4.) Mr. Vialpando
responded that the woman was his girlfriend and they had been in an argument. (Mot.
Hrg. Tr. 5.) Notably, when the trooper approached the vehicle, it was quite clear that the
woman was not with Mr. Vialpando or anywhere nearby. (Mot Hrg. Tr. 12.) Moreover,
the trooper did not attempt to locate the woman. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 12-13.)
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized three levels of police encounters with the
public which are constitutionally permissible:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions so
long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize
a person if the officer has an "articulable suspicion" that the person has
committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the "detention must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of
the stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable
cause to believe an offense has been committed or is being committed.
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (quoting United States v. Merritt
736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir.1984) (citation omitted)).
The hallmark of a level I voluntary police-citizen encounter is the right of a citizen
to decline answering an officer's inquiries simply by walking away. Salt Lake City v.
Ray. 998 P.2d 274, 277 (Utah App. 2000); State v. Bean. 869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App.
10

1994); State v. Jackson. 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah App. 1990). Most level I encounters
occur when a citizen in a public place is approached by police officers. See, e.g., Ray,
998 P.2d at 274 (in front of a convenience store); Deitman. 739 P.2d at 616 (on public
sidewalk/street); State v. Davis, 821 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1991) (on side of public road). A
level I encounter may escalate into a level II encounter when, viewing the totality of the
circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that he or she is not free to leave. State
v. Struhs. 940 P.2d 1225 , 1227-28 (Utah App. 1997); State v. Jackson. 805 P.2d 765,
767 (Utah App. 1990). A reasonable person would not feel free to leave when a officer,
by show of physical force or authority, restrains that person's liberty. Ray, 998 P.2d at
277; Bean, 869 P.2d at 986.
The encounter between Mr. Vialpando and Trooper Plank was certainly a level II
encounter. Trooper Plank observed Mr. Vialpando and immediately flipped on his sirens
and turned around to pursue Mr. Vialpando. The Trooper then caught up to Mr.
Vialpando as he entered a vehicle alone. At this point, Trooper Plank began to question
Mr. Vialpando about the woman the Trooper had seen moments before with Mr.
Vialpando.
To justify a level II seizure of a person, an officer must have reasonable,
articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime. Terry v.
Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Trujillo. 739 P.2d 85,
88 (Utah App. 1987).
11

The Trooper had no reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. Vialpando had committed or
was about to commit a crime, and therefore no reasonable suspicion to seize Mr.
Vialpando. The Trooper's decision to activate his overhead lights and immediately
pursue Mr. Vialpando indicate that this encounter was non-consensual and qualifies at
least as a level II encounter, which requires reasonable suspicion. Here, however, there
was no reasonable suspicion and therefore no basis for the seizure.
The trooper testified that he was curious as to why the man was chasing the
woman, and that he was possibly concerned for her safety. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 3-4.)
However, once he approached the vehicle, it was clear that the woman was nowhere in
the vicinity. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 12.) Thus, any possible concern the trooper may have had for
the woman's safety dissipated and there was no reasonable basis to proceed with the stop
and seizure of Mr, Vialpando. In reviewing the validity of the trooper's stop and seizure
of Mr. Vialpando, the trial court concluded as follows:
I think as we look at the circumstances today, we put on police
officers a terrible burden, particularly when it may require them to
investigate domestic violence. And I think anytime they see something that
could indicate a domestic-violence circumstance coming on, I think we
obligate them to check and see. If we don't, they're subject themselves to
some kind of activity for not doing something.
The fact that he saw what he saw, and has articulated it sufficient for
me to believe that he thought that a crime had either been committed or was
about to be committed, gives him a basis to turn around, stop, and inquire.
So I think that that test had been met. I think he had a right to do that.
(Mot. Hrg. Tr. 26-27.)
12

The trial court's conclusion is erroneous. Even in instances where the mere sight
of a police officer prompts the unprovoked flight of a person in a high crime area, the
United State's Supreme Court has concluded that such flight may only be used as di factor
in determining whether suspicious behavior warrants an investigatory stop by a police
officer of that person. See Illinois v. Wardlow. 528 U.S. 119 (2000). Here, the officer
saw one individual chasing another, but did not observe either party fleeing from him and
did not observe an act of assault or a threat thereof. Under these circumstances, the stop
of seizure and Mr. Vialpando was unlawful.
Morever, if in fact the trooper believed, as he testified, that a criminal offense was
about to be committed, then the absence of the woman from Mr. Vialpando's presence
dispensed with that concern, thereby negating any possible basis the trooper may have
had to initiate the stop. The trooper's stop of Mr. Vialpando was therefore lacking in
reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Accordingly, Mr. Vialpando respectfully asks
this Court to reverse the trial court's finding of reasonable suspicion and remand this case
for a new trial.
II

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ADMITTING
UNRELIABLE INTOXILYZER RESULTS
The trial court abused its discretion by admitting Intoxilyzer 5000 results which

were unreliable because Mr. Vialpando had vomited prior to taking the breath test and the
officer failed to comply with the required 15 minute observation period. In accordance
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with Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3(1), M[t]he commissioner of the Department of Public
Safety shall establish standards for the administration and interpretation of chemical
analysis of a person's breath, including standards of training." If such standards are
complied with, "there is a presumption that the test results are valid and further
foundation for introduction of the evidence is unnecessary." Utah Code Ann. § 41-644.3(3).
The Department of Public Safety, through the Utah Highway Patrol, requires a
minimum fifteen minute observation period in compliance with Baker, during which time
an officer must observe a subject to ensure that the subject does not ingest any substance
and to allow for the absorption of any mouth alcohol to ensure a reliable test result. The
Drinking Driver, Basic Intoxilyzer Manual 118 (UTAH HIGHWAY PATROL 1998). It is
beyond dispute that "unless a subject's mouth is free of all alcohol the test result will be
unreliable." State v. Baker, 355 P.2d 806, 811 (Wash. 1960) (en banc), cited with
approval in Salt Lake Citv v. WomacL 747 P.2d 1039, 1041 (Utah 1987). See also State
v. Carson, 988 P.2d 225 (Idaho App. 1999) (holding that state's failure to demonstrate
officer's compliance with a fifteen minute waiting period before the administration of
Intoxilyzer 5000 test rendered test results excludable as lacking foundation). Even
according to the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office Policies and Procedures Manual, an
"[a]rrestee will not be allowed to smoke, eat, or drink prior to taking a blood alcohol test."
§ 3-6.03.02(g).
14

The watershed case in this area is State v. Baker, 355 P.2d at 809-10. In Baker, the
defendant was involved in a car accident which resulted in the death of a police officer.
Id. at 808. The defendant admitted to having consumed alcohol prior to the accident but
denied being intoxicated at the time of the accident. Id. The defendant was asked to
submit to a breathalyzer test, which he agreed to do. Id. at 809. The results showed that
defendant's blood alcohol level was .18%. The defendant challenged the admission of
the breathalyzer results at trial, which the trial court denied. Following the defendant's
conviction of negligent homicide, he appealed the trial court's decision to admit the
breathalyzer results into evidence at trial. Id.
On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court evaluated the foundational
requirements that must be met before a breathalyzer test result may be admitted into
evidence. The Court concluded that the state must first produce prima facie evidence that
the following requirements have been met prior to admission of breathalyzer results: (1)
the breathalyzer machine must have been checked and be in proper working order at the
time of test; (2) the chemicals used must have been the right kind and compounded in
proper proportions; (3) the subject must have had nothing in his mouth at the time of the
test and must have taken nothing by mouth at least 15 minutes prior to taking the test; and
(4) the test must have been administered by a qualified operator in the proper manner.
Applying these standards, the court reviewed the record and concluded that the
state had failed to demonstrate that the defendant had nothing in his mouth at the time of
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the test or that he had taken nothing by mouth at least 15 minutes prior to submitting to
the test. Id. at 812. Accordingly, the court concluded that the admission of the test result
was erroneous and the defendant was entitled to a new trial. Id.
The 15 minute observation period is a foundational requirement which, if not
complied with, will render the test result inadmissible ab initio. The reason the
observation period is a foundational requirement is because the 15 minute period permits
the absorption of any foreign substance which might produce an artificially high result.
See Womack, 747 P.2d at 1041 n.2 ("[A] foreign substance present in the mouth which
might produce an artificially high result will be removed by absorption during the
observation period."). The state bears the burden of producing at least prima facie
evidence that it complied with the 15 minute observation period before the results of the
intoxilyzer may be admitted at trial.
Here, according to Trooper Plank's own report and testimony, Mr. Vialpando was
asked to submit to a blood alcohol test at 1:37 a.m. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 8.) At that time, Mr.
Vialpando had been stopped by Trooper Plank at the location of 3200 West South
Frontage Road. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 3-4.) The closest testing location was the Sorenson MultiCultural Center, located at 855 West California Avenue (approximately 1300 South).
(Mot. Hrg. Tr. 9.) After obtaining Mr. Vialpando's consent to administer the breath test,
Mr. Vialpando was transported to the Sorenson Center. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 9.) En route to
the Sorenson Center, Mr. Vialpando vomited. (Mot. Hrg. 9.) Trooper Plank testified that
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after Mr. Vialpando vomited, he checked Mr. Vialpando's mouth for any residual
substances. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 23.) The trooper testified that he did this while in his patrol
car, late at night. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 23.) Thereafter, Trooper Plank continued on to the
testing center and subjected Mr. Vialpando to the Intoxilyzer test. (Mot. Hrg. 9-11.) The
results of that test were returned at 2:00 a.m. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 10.)
The period of time between the trooper's request that Mr. Vialpando take the test
and the time the results were returned is a mere twenty-three minutes, despite the fact that
Mr. Vialpando, according to the Trooper's own report, "vomited before we got to the
intox." Notably, the Trooper testified that the fifteen minute waiting period took place, at
least in part, while he was transporting Mr. Vialpando to the Sorenson Center. (Mot. Hrg.
Tr. 15.) The trooper testified that although he was driving and was required to comply
with traffic laws, he was nevertheless able to observe Mr. Vialpando. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 1617.)
In State v. Carson. 988 P.2d 225 (Idaho App. 1999), the Idaho Court of Appeals
addressed the validity of an officer's compliance with the fifteen minute observation
period while in his patrol car. In Carson, the defendant was arrested for driving under the
influence of alcohol and transported to the sheriffs department to submit to an
Intoxilyzer 5000 breath alcohol test. Id. at 226. Upon arrival, the officer observed the
defendant for the requisite 15 minutes and then attempted to administer the test. Id. At
that point, the officer discovered that the machine was not operational. Id. Accordingly,
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the officer transported the defendant to a different location to submit to the test. Id. The
officer did not observe the defendant for an additional fifteen minutes and did not ask the
defendant if he had belched or vomited during the drive to the second testing site. Id.
During the drive from the first testing site to the second, the defendant was in the
officer's backseat on the passenger side, an overhead light illuminated the defendant, the
defendant was handcuffed with his hands behind his back, the officer periodically
observed the defendant in the rearview mirror and listened for any indication of belching
or regurgitation while he drove. Id During the drive, rain was falling, the windshield
wipers were operating and the officer was wearing a hearing aid in his left ear. I d
The defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of the breath test,
arguing that the state could not demonstrate an adequate foundation for admission of the
test results due to the officer's failure to comply with the fifteen minute observation
period. IdL The magistrate denied the motion and permitted admission of the test results
at trial. The defendant was subsequently convicted of driving under the influence at jury
trial and appealed to the district court, which reversed the magistrate, finding that the
officer's observation was not sufficient to permit admission of the test results. Id, The
state appealed.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. The court
noted that the purpose of the fifteen minute waiting period is to ensure that no alcohol or
other substances have been introduced into the subject's mouth from the outside or by
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belching or regurgitation. The purpose is to ensure the validity of the test results. Id at
227. The court concluded that although an officer need not stare at a test subject for the
full fifteen minute observation period, "the level of surveillance must be such as could
reasonably be expected to accomplish the purpose of the requirement.'1 Id. at 227.
Similarly, here, the trooper did not observe Mr. Vialpando for the fifteen minute
period in a manner that could reasonably be expected to accomplish the purpose of the
observation period. While the trooper testified that he observed Mr. Vialpando for 15
minutes, there is no proof in the record of such observation. The trooper testified that he
began the observation period after Mr. Vialpando vomited. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 15.) The
trooper did not testify at what time Mr. Vialpando vomited. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 15.)
Moreover, the trooper did not know when he arrived at the Sorenson Center. (Mot Hrg.
Tr. 17.) The only reliable time line information in evidence is the printout of the
Intoxilyzer 5000 test results, which were registered at 2:00 a.m. and the trooper's notation
that he began observing Mr. Vialpando for Baker purposes at 1:45 a.m. (R. 202.) The
Intoxilyzer 5000 result sheet also demonstrates that the initial testing began at 1:58 a.m.,
not at 2:00 a.m. (R. 202.) In addition, Mr. Vialpando was asked to submit to the breath
test at 1:37 a.m. and agreed to do so. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 16.) Considering this information,
according to the trooper's testimony, between 1:37 a.m. and 1:45 a.m.: (1) Mr. Vialpando
was handcuffed; (2) he was placed in the patrol car; (3) the trooper began driving him to
the testing center; (4) Mr. Vialpando asked the officer to pull over; (5) Mr. Vialpando
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vomited outside the trooper's vehicle; (6) the officer thoroughly checked Mr. Vialpando's
mouth; (7) Mr. Vialpando composed himself; and (8) the trooper and Mr. Vialpando
proceeded on their way to the Sorenson testing Center. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 20-23.) Under
these circumstances, without any information as to how the trooper divined that he began
the Baker observation period at 1:45 a.m., it is questionable whether the observation
period truly started at 1:45 a.m.
Even assuming the observation period did begin at 1:45 a.m., the trooper's
observation of Mr. Vialpando did not constitute a fifteen minute period. As is clear on
the Intoxilyzer result sheet, the testing of Mr. Vialpando began at 1:58 a.m., not 2:00 a.m.
Moreover, despite the fact that Mr. Vialpando vomited en route to the testing center, the
trooper did not ask Mr. Vialpando if he had burped or vomited before administering the
Intoxilyzer 5000 test. (Mot. Hrg. Tr. 19.)
Due to the Trooper's lack of observation of Mr. Vialpando for the 15 minute
period, given that Mr. Vialpando had vomited prior to submitting to the test, the results
of the breath test are unreliable and therefore inadmissible. The trooper's claim that he
complied with the fifteen minute observation period at least in part while driving Mr.
Vialpando to the Sorenson Center is insufficient to demonstrate compliance with the
Baker rule. If anything, the trooper's testimony demonstrates non-compliance with the
Baker rule, thereby requiring the state to submit additional evidence to meet its initial
burden of proof prior to the test results being admitted into evidence at trial.
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Because the state failed to meet its initial burden of proof demonstrating
compliance with the requisite fifteen minute observation period, the trial court erred in
admitting the results and the matter should be reversed and remanded for further
proceedings.
Ill

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE
JURY AS TO THE APPROPRIATE ELEMENTS AND PROOF
REQUIRED TO DEMONSTRATE ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL

The trial court erred in providing the civil actual physical control instruction to the
jury rather than ordering an instruction in accordance with the standards established in
criminal cases. In considering the propriety of a trial court's decision to provide a jury
instruction to which counsel has objected, this Court reviews the trial court's decision for
correctness. State v. Pearson. 985 P.2d 919, 921 (Utah App.1999); State v. Bryant. 965
P.2d 539, 544 (Utah .App.1998). Where the trial court fails to provide an accurate
instruction upon the basic elements of an offense, "failure to provide such an instruction
is reversible error that can never be considered harmless.11 State v. Pearson, 985 P.2d 919,
922 (Utah App. 1999) (quotations & citations omitted).
Here, the trial court instructed the jury in instruction number 5 that a defendant's
subjective intent to operate a vehicle does not prevent a finding of actual physical control.
(R. 173.) The court further instructed the jury in instruction number 8 as follows:
A person need not actually move, or attempt to move, a vehicle in
order to have actual physical control, the person only needs to have the
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apparent ability to start and move the vehicle.
(R. 177; Trial Tr. 81-82.) Counsel objected to the instruction in its entirety, arguing that
the instruction was lifted from language contained in opinions addressing the propriety of
revoking an individual's driving privilege, a proceeding which is civil in nature, and that
the language from the civil cases has been grafted into criminal cases erroneously. (Trial
Tr. 81-82.) Over counsel's objection, the court provided the instruction to the jury. (Trial
Tr. 81-82.)
A.

ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL DEFINED

1.

Utah Supreme Court cases

The starting point of any analysis of actual physical control begins with State v.
Bugger. 483 P.2d 442 (Utah 1971). In Bugger, a highway patrol officer found the
defendant asleep in his car, which was parked on the shoulder of a highway in Davis
County. Id. at 442. The car was wholly off the traveled portion of the roadway. Id.
When the patrol officer awakened the defendant and detected the odor of alcohol, he
arrested the defendant for being in actual physical control of the vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol. Id. at 443
The defendant was convicted and on appeal, challenged the validity of the driving
under the influence of alcohol statute (hereinafter D.U.I, statute) on vagueness grounds.
Id. In addressing the defendant's challenge, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the
case need not be considered on vagueness grounds. Rather, the Court addressed whether
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the defendant was actually in control of the vehicle at the time of his arrest. In analyzing
the issue of actual physical control, the Court provided the following guidance:
The word 'actual' has been defined as meaning 'existing in act or reality; *
* * in action or existence at the time being; present; * * *.' The word
'physical' is defined as 'bodily,' and 'control' is defined as 'to exercise
restraining or directing influence over; to dominate; regulate; hence, to hold
from actions; to curb.' The term in 'actual physical control' in its ordinary
sense means 'existing' or 'present bodily restraint, directing influence,
domination or regulation.'
WLat443.

Considering this definition of actual physical control, the Utah Supreme Court
reversed the defendant's conviction, concluding he was not controlling a vehicle or
exercising dominion over a vehicle at the time of his arrest. Id The court noted that the
defendant was not in the driver's seat of a vehicle on a traveled portion of the highway,
the motor of the vehicle was not running, the defendant was not attempting to steer the
vehicle while it was in motion, and the defendant was not attempting to brake the vehicle
to stop its movement. Id. Presumably these are instances where the Bugger Court would
have found actual physical control.
Notably, the Bugger Court's definition of actual physical control requires some
level of intention on the part of a motorist to drive or operate the vehicle. For example,
the Bugger Court relies on a definition of control which includes the exercise of restraint,
directing influence over, dominating, regulating, or holding forth from action. Each of
these definitions requires an affirmative action. Accordingly, Bugger stands for the
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proposition that occupancy of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol is not
sufficient to demonstrate proof beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual is in actual
physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and therefore in
violation of the D.U.I, statute.
Subsequently, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of actual physical
control in the civil context in Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778 (Utah 1986). In
Lopez, the appellant's driver's license was revoked by the Utah State Driver's License
Division due to his refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test, in accordance with the
implied consent statute. Id. at 780. The appellant appealed that ruling and a trial de novo
was held in the district court wherein the court affirmed the administrative decision
suspending the appellant's driving privileges, based on the finding that the defendant had
been in actual physical control of his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and had
refused to submit to a blood alcohol test. Id The appellant appealed from the trial
court's decision to the Utah Supreme Court. Id.
In Lopez, police officers who were investigating a prowler report at 3:00 a.m. on
March 18, 1984, were stopped by a citizen who directed the officers to the defendant's
truck. Id. at 779. The appellant's truck was parked by a telephone booth, the engine was
not running and fresh tire tracks in the snow demonstrated that the truck had recently
been driven to the place it was parked. Id, When the officers approached the truck, the
appellant was in the driver's seat, his head resting on the steering wheel. Id
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An officer tapped on the window, helped the appellant open the truck door and
then caught the appellant when he fell out of his truck. Id. The officer detected the odor
of alcohol, and observed that the appellant was drooling, had poor balance and needed
assistance to stand upright. IdL The keys were in the ignition and the officer had to turn
the key to remove it from the ignition. Id. The appellant submitted to a number of field
sobriety tests and failed all of them. Id. As a result, the appellant was placed under arrest
for driving under the influence of alcohol. Id.
The officers asked the appellant to submit to blood alcohol test, which the
appellant refused. Id. Later, the appellant was again asked to submit to a blood alcohol
test and was advised that if he refused to submit, his driving privileges would be
suspended for a year. Li at 779-780. The appellant did not respond. IdL at 780.
The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's affirmation of the Division's
revocation of the appellant's driving privileges. Id. at 781. The Supreme Court noted
that in a revocation proceeding, the Division has the burden of demonstrating two facts:
(1) that a motorist is in actual physical control of a vehicle, and (2) the arresting officer
has reasonable grounds to believe that the operator is then under the influence of alcohol.
Id. On appeal from a Division's revocation decision, the trial court must "determine by a
preponderance of the evidence 'whether the petitioner's license is subject to revocation
under the provisions of this chapter.'" Id, quoting Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44. l-(2).
The appellant in Lopez had argued that his truck was inoperable and thus, the
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Division had failed to meet its burden of demonstrating he had exercised actual physical
control over the vehicle. The trial court heard this argument but "found by a
preponderance that there was probable cause to arrest [the petitioner], that he had been
requested to take the breath test, and that he had been warned of the consequences if there
was refusal." Id. The trial court had deemed the arrest proper, as demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence, because the petitioner was in the car alone, he had the
keys to the truck, the tire tracks leading up to the truck demonstrated that the vehicle was
operable and had gotten to its resting place on its own power, and the petitioner had failed
the field sobriety tests. Id. at 780.
In addressing the petitioner's argument that his vehicle was disabled, thereby
rendering him incapable of driving the vehicle, the Supreme Court noted that even if it
were to accept that the truck was inoperable, such a finding would not necessarily change
the finding of actual physical control.
11

Where, as here, circumstantial evidence permits a legitimate inference that
the car was where it was and was performing as it was because of the
defendant's choice, it follows that the defendant was in actual physical
control. To hold otherwise could conceivably allow an intoxicated driver
whose vehicle was rendered inoperable in a collision to escape
prosecution."
Id at 781, quoting State v. Smelter. 36 Wash.App. 439, 674 P.2d 690 (1984) (citation
omitted).
The final actual physical control case to be addressed by the Utah Supreme Court
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occurred in 1982 in Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651. In Garcia, the appellant was
in the driver's seat of his vehicle, attempting to start its motor when police officers
arrived. Id. at 652. The appellant was immediately arrested and charged with driving or
being in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Id. at
652. The appellant refused to submit to a blood alcohol level test. Id. As a result, the
appellant's driver's license was revoked by the Driver's License Division. Id. The
appellant petitioned the trial court, where a trial de novo was held. The trial court
affirmed the Division's decision to revoke over the appellant's argument that the Division
had failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that he was in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Id On appeal, the Supreme Court
affirmed the revocation of the appellant's driving privileges, concluding as follows:
As a matter of public policy and statutory construction, we believe that the
"actual physical control" language of Utah's implied consent statute should
be read as intending to prevent intoxicated drivers from entering their
vehicles except as passengers or passive occupants as in Bugger, supra.
Therefore, under the facts before us, where a motorist occupied the driver's
position behind the steering wheel, with possession of the ignition key and
with the apparent ability to start and move the vehicle, we hold that there
has been an adequate showing of "actual physical control" under our
implied consent statute.
Id. at 654 (footnote omitted). The Court specifically limited its decision to driver's
license revocation proceedings as is denoted by reference to the implied consent statute.
Both at the time of the Garcia decision and as the statute reads today, the implied consent
statute provides for the revocation of an operator's driver's license if the operator refuses
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to submit to a chemical test to determine whether the individual is operating or in actual
physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol above .08% or to a
degree that renders the operator incapable of safely operating the vehicle. Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (1), (2). This statutory section is separate from the section
criminalizing the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol. Compare Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6-44 (defining criminal offense of D.U.I, and accompanying penalties) with
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (identifying circumstances requiring motorist to submit to
blood alcohol test at officer's request and imposing penalty of license revocation for
refusal to comply).
2.

Court of Appeals Cases

The Court of Appeals addressed the issue of actual physical control in the criminal
context in 1990. In Richfield City v. Walker, 790 P.2d 87 (Utah App. 1990), this Court
was asked to consider whether a sleeping driver had actual physical control over his
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. In Walker, the defendant had driven in the
early morning hours to a motel in search of a room. Id at 88. Because there were no
vacancies, the defendant returned to his truck in the motel parking lot and fell asleep. Id
at 88-89. Later, a sheriffs deputy found the defendant asleep in his truck, with the engine
off and headlights on. The doors to the truck were unlocked and the keys were in the
ignition. IdL at 89. The defendant's blood alcohol registered at .21% within a half an
hour of his arrest, id. The defendant was convicted of being in actual physical control of
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his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and he appealed the finding of actual
physical control. IdL at 91.
On appeal, the court of appeals cited to the Garcia decision for the proposition that
"intoxicated motorists should be kept out of their vehicles except as passengers or passive
occupants, and should be apprehended before they strike." Id. The court then proceeded
to outline factors that are important in determining whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, a person is in actual physical control of his or her vehicle. Id Those
factors include:
(1) whether defendant was asleep or awake when discovered; (2) the
position of the automobile; (3) whether the automobile's motor was
running; (4) whether defendant was positioned in the driver's seat of the
vehicle; (5) whether defendant was the vehicle's sole occupant; (6) whether
defendant had possession of the ignition key; (7) defendant's apparent
ability to start and move the vehicle; how the car got to where it was found;
and (9) whether defendant drove it there.
Id. at 93. Considering these factors, the court affirmed the defendant's conviction,
finding that he was in actual physical control of the truck. Id. at 93. Notably, none of the
standards set forth in Walker require proof of intent to exercise control or dominion over
a vehicle.
Finally, in State v. Barnhart 850 P.2d 473 (Utah App. 1993), this Court again
considered a defendant's challenge to his conviction under the D.U.I, statute based on
actual physical control. In Barnhart, the defendant had driven his girlfriend's car to the
grocery store to meet her. Id. at 474. Prior to driving to the store, the defendant had
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consumed two cans of beer. Id. The defendant had intended for his girlfriend to drive
him home in her car. Id. at 474-75. While waiting for his girlfriend, the defendant
consumed seven additional beers. Id. at 475. Later, when the store had closed, the
grocery store manager called the police because the defendant was still in the parking lot.
Id. When an officer arrived, the defendant was found sitting upright in the driver's seat of
the vehicle. Id. at 475. The keys were in the ignition but the engine was cold. Id.
Although the officer tried to tap on the window of the vehicle to get the defendant's
attention, the defendant did not respond. IdL Thus, the officer opened the door and shook
the defendant until he awoke. Id When the defendant awoke he was very disoriented
and the officer could detect a strong odor of alcohol emanating from the defendant and
his vehicle. Id. After failing the field sobriety tests, the defendant was placed under
arrest and a subsequent test showed that the defendant's blood alcohol level was .18%.
Id

.

. •

In finding the defendant guilty under the D.U.I, statute, the trial court concluded
that although the defendant was not under the influence to a degree that would render him
in violation of the law at the time he drove to the grocery store, because the defendant had
possession of the ignition key, which was in the ignition of the car, and had the ability to
start and move the vehicle despite his unconscious state, the defendant was in actual
physical control of the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Id. at 475. In
Barnhart this Court cited to Garcia for the proposition that f,a person need not actually
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move, or attempt to move, a vehicle, but only needs to have an apparent ability to start
and move the vehicle in order to be in actual physical control." Barnhart 850 P.2d at 479
(citation omitted). It is from this assertion that the challenged jury instruction emanates.
B.

ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING
REQUIRES SOME SHOWING OF INTENT WHILE SUCH
SHOWING IS NOT NECESSARY IN THE CIVIL CONTEXT

In order to demonstrate actual physical control in a criminal proceeding, the state
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant intended to operate or exercise
control over a motor vehicle. In Bugger, the Court adopted a definition of "actual
physical control" which requires that a vehicle's occupants actively and affirmatively
choose to exercise dominion or control over a motor vehicle. 483 P.2d at 443. Since the
issuance of Bugger, it appears that the Utah Supreme Court has addressed the issue of
actual physical control only in the context of civil driver's license revocation proceedings
while this Court has considered the issue of actual physical control only in the criminal
context.
While a court in a civil proceeding may rely on standards and principles set forth
in criminal proceedings of a similar nature, due to the differing burdens of proof, the
reverse is not permissible. That is, the Lopez and Garcia decisions are not binding with
respect to actual physical control in criminal cases because they deal with standards that
must be met in a civil driver's license revocation proceeding, which is subject only to a
preponderance of the evidence standard, while criminal cases require proof beyond a
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reasonable doubt. See Muir v. Cox, 611 P.2d 384 (Utah 1980) (An action in defense of
plaintiffs driving privileges is a civil matter and not criminal); Garcia v. Schwendiman,
645 P.2d 651, 652 (Utah 1982) ("In contrast to prosecutions under criminal statutes, a
license revocation proceeding requires proof only by a preponderance of the evidence and
not beyond a reasonable doubt.1'). This distinction is particularly appropriate where
driving, and thus a driver's license, is considered a privilege and not a right in the state of
Utah. Moran v. Shaw, 580 P.2d 241, 242-43 (Utah 1978), superceded by § 41-6-44.10 on
other grounds.
Despite this difference, this Court has relied extensively on Lopez and Garcia to
determine whether actual physical control has been established in a criminal case beyond
a reasonable doubt, almost to the exclusion of the Utah Supreme Court's decision in
Bugger. As a result of such reliance, the civil standard for demonstrating actual physical
control has consumed the criminal standard, to the extent that no proof of any intention to
exercise control is required. See, e.g.. State v. Barnhart, 850 P.2d at 478 ("a person need
not actually move, or attempt to move, a vehicle, but only needs to have an apparent
ability to start and move the vehicle in order to be in actual physical control."). Such
application is in contravention of Bugger.
The Bugger Court's definition of actual physical control provides as follows:
The word 'actual' has been defined as meaning 'existing in act or reality; *
* * in action or existence at the time being; present; * * *.' The word
'physical' is defined as 'bodily,' and 'control' is defined as 'to exercise
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restraining or directing influence over; to dominatef2]; regulatep]; hence, to
hold from actions; to curb.' The term in 'actual physical control5 in its
ordinary sense means 'existing5 or 'present bodily restraint, directing
influence, domination or regulation.'
483 P.2d at 443. The definition set forth by Bugger thus requires some intentional act by
a vehicle's operator to drive or operate the vehicle. The Bugger Court identified
particular scenarios where proof of actual physical control beyond a reasonable doubt
may be demonstrated: (1) a defendant in the driver's seat of a vehicle on the traveled
portion of a highway with the motor running; (2) a defendant attempting to steer a vehicle
while it is in motion; or (3) a defendant attempting to brake a vehicle to stop its
movement. Id. Each of the scenarios presented by the Bugger Court reflect some
affirmative action that would be required by individual before actual physical control
could be demonstrated. Notably, the Utah Supreme Court has not overruled Bugger and
it is currently the controlling law in the area of actual physical control in criminal cases.
Thus, Bugger requires the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant was
in actual physical control of a vehicle with the intention to exercise such control.4

2

Webster's dictionary defines ''dominate", in relevant part, as follows: "1: RULE,
CONTROL 2 : to exert the supreme determining or guiding influence over . . . . "
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 374 (MERRIAM-WEBSTER 1988).
3

Webster's dictionary defines ''regulate", in relevant part, as follows:" to govern
or direct according to rule
" WEBSTER'S NINTH DICTIONARY 992 (MERRIAMWEBSTER 1988).
4

Counsel believes that the substantial burden of persuasion for overturning prior
precedent has been met in this case given that the standards applied by the court of
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C.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT THE
APPARENT ABILITY TO MOVE A VEHICLE, ABSENT ANY INTENT
TO CONTROL A VEHICLE, CONSTITUTES ACTUAL PHYSICAL
CONTROL
Absent an instruction requiring the state to prove that Mr. Vialpando intended to

exercise control over the vehicle, the trial court erred in instructing the jury that Mr.
Vialpando's mere ability to move the vehicle was sufficient to demonstrate actual
physical control. The jury was instructed as to the factors set forth in the Walker
decision. (R. 175.) The jury was further instructed that the defendant's subjective intent
to operate a vehicle is not necessary to find the defendant was in actual physical control
(R. 173) and that the apparent ability of the defendant to move the vehicle, without more,
supports a finding of actual physical control. (R. 177.)
An appellate court "will reverse the trial court only if its interpretation of the law
results in a misapplication of the law to established facts or works to prevent relevant
facts from being admitted." Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238, 1249
(Utah 1998) (citation omitted). "The State must prove every element of a crime to
convict an accused defendant." State v. Pearson. 985 P.2d 919, 922 (Utah App. 1999),
citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(1) (1995); cf. State v. Stringham. 957 P.2d 602, 608
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). Where a jury instruction does not fairly instruct the jury on the
appeals in D.U.I, cases do not comport with the requirements set forth in Bugger, a Utah
Supreme Court decision. See State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393, 399 n.3 (Utah 1994)
(Observing that the doctrine of vertical stare decisis requires a lower court to follow the
holding of a higher court, including judicial dicta).
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mens rea requirement for the basic elements of the charged offense, the error is reversible
and can never be considered harmless. Id. (citations omitted.)
Here, the objectionable jury instructions failed to inform the defendant of the
appropriate mens rea for the offense of being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol. (R. 173; 175; 177.) The instructions to the jury
completely failed to inform the jury of the intent requirement set forth in Bugger, thereby
permitting the jury to convict Mr. Vialpando of violating the D.U.I, statute without
evidence that Mr. Vialpando ever intended to operate or control a motor vehicle. Because
the instructions failed to properly inform the jury of the mens rea requirement of Mr.
Vialpando's intent to control the motor vehicle, there is no way of knowing if the jury
found beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Vialpando intended to control the vehicle.
Under these circumstances, the only way to cure the deficient jury instructions is to
reverse and remand for a new trial.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Mr. Vialpando respectfully request that this Court
reverse his conviction and remand this case for a new trial.
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I, SHANNON N. ROMERO, hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered
eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111, and two copies to the District Attorney's Office, 231 East 400
South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this

of December, 2002.
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Addendum B

INSTRUCTION NO.

<Q

The subjective intent of the defendant not to operate a vehicle does not
prevent you fromfindingthat the defendant was in actual physical control.

INSTRUCTION NO.

A person need not actually move, or attempt to move, a vehicle in
order to have actual physical control, the person only needs to have the
apparent ability to start and move the vehicle.

